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This study performs a panel analysis of banks’ participation and bidding in the Eurosystem weekly
repo auctions during July 2000-August 2001, employing a data set of individual bids that includes
the bidder code, size, nationality and membership in a banking group. We adopt the econometric ap-
proach of Wooldridge (1995) to obtain consistent estimates in the presence of endogenous sample
selection. We find that an increase in interest rate volatility lowers the probability of bidding, but in-
duces bidders to shade bid rates less relative to the interbank market rate. We document several
country effects, related to differences in the structure of the domestic money market and the opportu-
nity cost of collateral. Large bidders participate more regularly and shade their bids less. Group bid-
ders demand larger amounts in the auction, thus showing an attitude to act as liquidity brokers to-
wards the rest of the banking system. Large bidders and group bidders manage their collateral more
efficiently, as revealed by their superior ability to “ride the yield curve” and submit multiple bids.
Our findings support the transnational bank hypothesis, according to which banks with a multina-
tional profile use their informational advantage to arbitrage out the differences in interest rates across
countries, thus fostering money market integration.
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1
Every week several hundreds of banks in the euro area participate in the Eurosystem repo auc-
tion, the so-called main refinancing operation (MRO), which injects reserve money in the banking
system. With average weekly allotments that currently exceed 250 billion euro and several hundreds
of bidders, MROs are the largest auctions ever held in the world. They take place in a decentralised
fashion, whereby the collection of bids and the provision of funds are carried out at local level by the
National Central Banks (NCBs), whereas the ECB compiles the aggregate bid schedule and decides
on the allotment. Through the interbank market the successful bidders channel the allotted funds to
7,000 credit institutions in the area, for their day-to-day liquidity management and the fulfilment of
the reserve requirement. Although not the exclusive vehicle of refinancing for the Eurosystem
2, the
MROs are the primary instrument for the implementation of the single monetary policy. After an ini-
tial period in which the MROs were conducted through fixed rate tenders, in June 2000 the Eurosys-
tem switched to a variable rate, discriminatory (pay your bid) auction. The present auction format
retains some flavour of the old one because, in order to preserve the announcement effect, the ECB’s
Governing Council sets the minimum bid rate which acts as the indicator of the monetary policy
stance, a role played in the US by the Federal funds target rate.
Who bids and why in the Eurosystem auctions? The objective of this paper is to perform a
panel study of banks’ participation and bidding in the MROs during June 2000-August 2001 with a
new data set of individual bids that includes the bidder code, size, nationality and possible member-
ship in a banking group.
Our motivation is twofold. Perhaps the most popular tenet of auction theory is the winner’s
curse hypothesis (Milgrom and Weber, 1982), according to which auction participants bid a price
below their valuation of the good when uncertainty is high. Previous research on the Eurosystem
auctions, adopting mainly auction theoretical models, has shown an apparently puzzling phenome-
                                                        
1  This paper draws from a contribution to the Study group on bidding behaviour set up by the Market Op-
erations Committee of the ECB in 2001. We are grateful for helpful comments to Paolo Angelini, Fabio
Panetta, Francesco Papadia, Margarida Catalao, Franco Peracchi, Stefano Siviero, Tuomas Välimäki, Sylvain
Gouteron, Philipp Hartmann, Cyril Monnet, two anonymous referees and to seminar participants at the Banca
d’Italia, the XI Tor Vergata Financial Conference, the 2003 European Finance Association Meeting and the
ECB Workshop on Monetary Policy Implementation, January 2005. We are also very grateful to Ekaterini Ky-
riazidou and Maria Rochina-Barrachina for useful suggestions on econometric models for panel data with en-
dogenous sample selection. The usual disclaimer applies.
2  The so-called longer term refinancing operations (LTROs) are held by the Eurosystem once a month
with a maturity of three months, through a variable-rate, discriminatory auction. LTROs, accounting on average
for one quarter of the aggregate stock of refinancing, are not used for short term rate management. The third
means of refinancng, denominated marginal lending facility, is an end-of-day standing facility at penalising
rates and with overnight maturity. It should also be recalled that the Eurosystem remunerates required reserves
at market rates.8
non. Bindseil, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) measure the extent to which bid rates are below market
rates in the MROs and find that this type of underpricing varies inversely with market rate volatility.
This finding is at odds with the winner’s curse hypothesis and most of the empirical evidence on
treasury auctions
3. On the other hand, examining the Eurosystem longer term refinancing operations,
Linzert, Nautz and Bindseil (2004) show that banks behave accordingly to the winner’s curse hy-
pothesis
4.
Our first motivation is to shed light on bidders’ behaviour in the MROs by exploiting primarily
the implications of the models of banks’ optimum reserve management. The Eurosystem auctions are
different from treasury auctions for several reasons; among other things, bidders in the former face a
quantity risk related to the minimum reserve requirement, and to the caps on and costs of alternative
sources of funds, namely the interbank market and the end-of-day marginal lending facility of the Eu-
rosystem. Our analytical framework also draws from money market microstructure considerations.
The ensuing hypotheses form the basis for the empirical analysis. Our data enables us to perform
panel regressions of each of four variables which completely characterise bidders’ behaviour in the
MROs. Through the individual bidder code we can track the decision to participate or not in the auc-
tions, the first variable of interest, modelled as the sample selection equation. The knowledge of the
individual bid schedules further allows us to model the three regression equations, respectively for
the bid amount, the average bid rate and the dispersion of bid rates.
A methodological novelty of this paper, compared to the empirical studies of bidding behav-
iour in financial auctions, is that we properly account for the presence of two sources of bias in the
estimates of the regression equations for the bid amount, rate and dispersion. The first source is re-
lated to unobservable heterogeneity in individual characteristics and preferences, which are poten-
tially correlated with the observable variables. To control for this type of bias we adopt a fixed ef-
fects panel regression framework. The second potential distortion derives from endogenous sample
selection, which arises because the sample employed in the analysis is selected non-randomly. To
correct for sample selection bias we follow the Wooldridge (1995) two-step estimation approach,
which yields consistent results for the vector of coefficients and the associated standard errors.
While the above considerations motivate the first part of this paper, where we formulate and
estimate a general empirical model of participation and bidding in the auctions, a different aim in-
                                                        
3  See for example Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002).
4  The latter finding should be interpreted in light of the different nature and maturity of the LTROs com-
pared to the MROs (see footnote 2). Among past studies, Breitung and Nautz (2001) perform a panel analysis
of bidding by German banks under the Eurosystem fixed rate tenders.9
spires the second part of the paper. Although from an econometric viewpoint we specialise the analy-
sis, in the second part our interest is broader.
Achieving a high level of integration in the euro area money market has been among the pri-
orities of the Eurosystem, in consideration of the anchoring role played by the short term rate for the
whole yield curve (see for example ECB, 2004). This is reflected in the choice of an operational
framework that supplies central bank refinancing to any bank in the area fulfilling some minimum
standards, against a very wide pool of collateral. Yet, banks’ activity in the money market may in
principle be diversified in a number of fashions
5. A remarkable feature of the European banking
structure (Ehrmann et al., 2003) is the atomistic configuration of banks in some nations, notably
Germany, Austria and Finland, characterised by a large number of credit cooperatives and savings
banks in comparison to the other member countries. This in turn generates a network, or two-tier,
banking structure, where large banks in the upper tier serve as head institutions for small, lower-tier
banks
6. The distinguishing feature of banks in other EMU countries, like France, Italy and Spain, is a
larger availability of capital and liquid assets. The existence of a two-tier structure of the money
market has been explicitly modelled by Freixas and Holthausen (2005), who show that big banks
having access to information in several countries may achieve cross-border liquidity smoothing, thus
overcoming the welfare-reducing effects of information asymmetries.
A few years after the inception of the single monetary policy, the quest of public authorities
and market players for the integration of the euro area money market seems on the whole rewarded.
The recent empirical studies have reached three broad conclusions. First, each of the unsecured and
overnight swap segments have quickly merged into an area-wide market
7. This ensures a smooth
time-series path for the reference overnight rate, EONIA
8,9, as well as negligible interest rate differ-
entials among member countries. Second, the development of the market for short term securities and
repo contracts lags behind, owing mainly to legal and administrative segmentation, although cross-
border repo turnover shows an increasing trend as traders make a growing use of links among Central
                                                        
5  The detection of frictions in the money market, and thus in the banks’ access to liquidity, might have far
reaching consequences for the monetary policy transmission mechanism. See for example Bean, Larsen and
Nikolov (2003), Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon and Terlizzese (2003).
6  The role of bank size in the money market has been documented also in non-European countries. For the
US see for example Allen, Peristiani and Saunders (1989).
7 See ECB (2001a), Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003), Gaspar, Pérez Quirós and Sicilia (2001), Hartmann,
Manna and Manzanares (2001).
8  EONIA is the acronym of Euro Over-Night Index Average.
9  See Pérez Quirós and Rodriguez Mendizábal (2004).10
Securities Depositories
10. Third, larger banks with a multinational dimension tend to centralise their
liquidity management activities. What do we know about the “primary market” for liquidity, that is
the Eurosystem repo auctions? Under the current auction format, the available evidence from analy-
ses of aggregate data shows that bidding is competitive and most of the early problems encountered
under the fixed-rate format have been overcome
11.
In the second part of this paper we look at the extent of integration in the repo auctions. These
are by construction standardised and very open, yet participation may reflect peculiarities, related in
particular to country effects, size effects and bank group effects. Each one of them in turn could tell
us something on the issue of integration, which is essentially related to institutional factors and to
market factors. The conjecture that country may matter is based on the available evidence, showing
that the daily demand for reserves in member countries displays different degrees of interest–rate
elasticity and that some regional effects are present in the interbank market’s functioning (Angelini,
2002). The finding that country matters would thus suggest that, from the perspective of bidding be-
haviour, integration is not complete. One could then hypothesise that higher stages of integration
might be achieved in the future, also in view of planned institutional innovations. We refer in par-
ticular to the enlargement of the pool of eligible collateral to include bank loans throughout the area,
according to the ECB’s Governing Council decision on the “single list” of 2004
12. On the other hand,
the finding that size and participation in a group systematically affect bidding behaviour across the
geographical borders might have implications for the hypothesis that larger and/or multinational
banks act as promoters of integration, which is typically a market factor. Therefore, using the infor-
mation on the bidders’ nationality, size and possible membership in a multi-country banking group,
we specialise the panel analysis and test whether and how the behaviour of bidders is affected by
each of these three variables in turn.
To put our effort in the right perspective, two remarks are in order. First, our investigation is
largely exploratory. Unlike the studies on world market integration
13, we do not perform a test nor
                                                        
10  See ECB (2001a), Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003), Giovannini Group (2002).
11  The initial choice of the fixed-rate tender, aimed at conveying a strong signal on the stance of monetary
policy, involved some distortions in bidding behaviour at times of interest rate change expectations; see for ex-
ample Ayuso and Repullo (2001, 2003), Catalao (2001), Nautz and Oechssler (2003). Some distortions may
appear also under the variable rate auction with minimum bid rate, if rate cut expectations prevail in the market.
Välimäki (2002) and  Ewerhart (2002) provide theoretical analyses of the auction under these circumstances.
12  On 5 August 2004 the ECB announced the plan to replace the current two-tier collateral system, which
allows some asset classes to be eligible in selected countries only, with a single collateral list throughout the
euro area. Bank loans will be included in the single list. The single list will bring about a substantial increase in
the eligible asset pool, particularly in eight countries where bank loans are currently ineligible.
13  See for example Bekaert and Harvey (1995).11
derive an index on the scale of integration in the repo auctions. This choice is related to the fact that
our data sample spans a relatively short interval of time. Second, the notion of market integration is
usually associated to the law of one price, and hence it might perhaps be viewed as an all-or-nothing
issue. Our empirical results for the price equation, i.e. the bid rate, although revealing significant
regularities, have an order of magnitude that does not seriously challenge the broad validity of the
law of one price in the euro money market. Bearing in mind the above considerations, we see our
contribution on the issue of market integration as an attempt to exploit the microeconomic evidence
of bidding and pin down the factors, both institutional and market-driven, that are likely to hold back
or foster integration in the euro money market in the future.
In Section 2 we describe the analytical framework and derive testable predictions for bidders’
behaviour in the MROs. Section 3 presents the auction environment and gives summary statistics on
the data sample. Section 4 describes our econometric approach. Section 5 shows the empirical results
from the general model of participation and bidding. Section 6 presents the estimates on country ef-
fects. The evidence on size effects is given in Section 7. Section 8 contains the estimates on the effect
of participation in a banking group. Section 9 summarises our findings and concludes. The Appendix
provides details of the ARCH model for interest rate volatility.
2. Theoretical predictions
Banks’ behaviour in the Eurosystem auctions should be viewed within the broader context of
optimum reserve management models (see in particular Campbell, 1987; Hamilton, 1996; Furfine,
2000; Bartolini, Bertola and Prati, 2001; Taylor, 2001; Angelini, 2002). In a simple two-period set-
ting characterised by a minimum reserve requirement with averaging, exogenous liquidity shocks and
stochastic interbank interest rates, the bank’s optimum demand for reserves in the first period is di-
rectly related to the forecast liquidity need and to the difference between the expected interest rate in
the next period and the current interest rate (Taylor, 2001), i.e. to the forward rate spread. Under the
hypothesis that banks are risk averse, it may further be shown (Angelini, 2002) that an increase in
short term rate volatility will induce the representative bank to demand a larger amount of reserves in
the first period. We note that bidding in the Eurosystem auctions is a key part of the bank’s overall
demand for reserves, the remainder being reflected in interbank market transactions, and we expect
the former to be driven in the first place by the economic forces described by the theory. When we
translate the theoretical hypotheses into our bidding environment, we note that each bank is no longer
a rate-taker as in the stylised models, because it may bid a rate as well as a quantity of reserves. This
implies that the three explanatory variables, namely liquidity need, forward rate spread and interest12
rate volatility, should all have a positive effect on the decision to participate in the auction, the total
bid amount and the average bid rate of each bank.
We list these qualitative hypotheses in Table 1, where the first column gives the candidate ex-
planatory variables for each of the dependent variables, namely participation (column P), bid amount
(column B), average interest rate (column R) and bid rate dispersion (column D). Each cell reports a
+/- sign showing the effect of the explanatory variables onto each dependent variable and a symbol
indicating the relevant theory.
When we move to a multi-period world with reserve averaging, it can be argued (Furfine,
2000) that the endowment of reserves inherited from the past enters into play, affecting inversely to-
day’s demand for balances. In our framework, the reserve endowment can be captured by the reserve
fulfilment ratio of a bank, given by the average reserve holdings (until the day before the auction) di-
vided by the bank’s reserve requirement. The reserve fulfilment should thus have the opposite effect
of liquidity need on the dependent variables P, B and R.
An additional feature of the reserve management model as it becomes increasingly realistic is
that banks may have a target level of end-of-day reserves, related to the need for working balances
and the desire to fulfil the requirement smoothly (Campbell, 1987; Hamilton, 1996; Bartolini. Bertola
and Prati, 2001). We cast this hypothesis into our setting by postulating that the bidder seeks to some
extent to roll over the amount of the MRO that expires on the auction’s settlement day. Hence his de-
cision to participate in the auction, bid amount and average bid rate should be positively affected by
the explanatory variable Maturing MRO amount. Accordingly, these hypotheses are included in Ta-
ble 1.
Participation and bidding in the MROs can also be viewed from the perspective of auction the-
ory. A classical argument is that in a discriminatory auction with private information on the resale
value of the good, bidders adjust their bids for the winner’s curse. In our setting this would imply that
bidders respond to an increase in interest rate volatility by reducing quantity demanded, reducing the
average bid rate and increasing rate dispersion. It may also be argued that small, marginal bidders
facing increased volatility could even decide to stay away from the auction, and make recourse in-
stead to the interbank market. We note however that the “loser’s nightmare” argument may be in-
voked against the prediction of the winner’s curse on bid amount and rate. Namely, if the risk of los-
ing, not winning, the auction is a concern for the participants, then it is possible that interest rate
volatility may induce them to submit larger bids at higher rates (Simon, 1994). That the loser’s
nightmare may prevail over the winner’s curse is suggested by the existence of caps on credit lines
among banks, which constrain the recourse to the interbank market, and to the peculiar setting of the13
MRO auction, where the auctioneer is in a special position, whereby he imposes an intertemporal
constraint on the minimum amount of the good, i.e. reserves, that bidders have to hold. We note that
the predictions of the loser’s nightmare would be consistent with those of the reserve management
model under risk aversion.
An important feature of our bidding environment is the possibility that some bidders are
“squeezed” after the auction, thus being forced to borrow in the interbank market at very high interest
rates in order to fulfil the reserve requirement. The squeeze may result from lower than expected
supply in the auction, such as to make liquidity tight at the aggregate level. A model in which bidders
face the risk of a squeeze subsequent to the auction is developed by Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001),
who formulate in particular the hypothesis that a bidder entering the auction with a short liquidity po-
sition will increase the variance of bids. In the absence of data on the individual liquidity positions of
bidders in our sample (see the next section), there is no direct translation of the above proposition in
our setting on a cross-section basis. However, if we adopt extensively the above hypothesis over dif-
ferent auctions in time, it might be argued that an increase in the probability of a short squeeze is
likely to make the short positions of bidders even worse. Thus we hypothesise that the likelihood of a
short squeeze would increase the variance of bid rates, together with participation and bid amount.
Other strands of research and empirical considerations can be brought to bear on our empirical
model. In particular, we believe that the Freixas-Holthausen hypothesis, that larger banks with a
multinational role will arbitrage out the differences in interest rates across countries, has an important
implication for bidding in the Eurosystem auctions. Ceteris paribus, we would expect larger banks to
participate more actively in the auctions and submit larger bids compared to smaller banks with a lo-
cal profile and limited information. This suggests that the bidder’s size and participation in a multi-
country banking group may be included among the set of explanatory variables.
The use of collateral to be pledged against the Eurosystem refinancing involves an opportunity
cost for banks, related to the liquidity of the assets. As we have noted, there is a great variety in the
list of eligible collateral. It may be argued that, as the auction size increases, corresponding to an in-
crease in the aggregate liquidity need, the use of “dear” collateral is likely to increase as well. Other
things being equal, the increase in the marginal cost of collateral would cause a downward pressure
on the individual bid amount and rates, along with a tendency to disperse more. Furthermore, using a
standard cost-of-carry argument, it may be argued that the cost of marketable collateral is inversely
related to the spread between long term yields and the minimum rate set by the Eurosystem. An in-
crease in the long term spread would indeed make it more profitable for banks to buy or repo-in col-
lateral and fund it with short term money from the Eurosystem or, in the traders’ parlance, “ride the
curve”. This is particularly true of assets with an active interbank repo market, like treasury securities14
and asset-backed securities, which represent the bulk of eligible collateral in the euro area. Hence, we
would expect the long term spread to have a positive impact on banks’ participation and bid amount.
Lastly, we note that participation and bidding is also affected by the spread between the short
term money market rate, represented by the 2-week EONIA swap rate
14, and the Eurosystem mini-
mum bid rate, which incorporates the expectations on the stance of monetary policy. For instance, the
expectation of an imminent rate cut by the ECB, pulling the value of the short term spread close to or
even below zero, would involve a reduction in the number of bidders, bid amount, rates and disper-
sion. The opposite would hold under expectations of monetary policy tightening and a large value of
the short rate spread. It might be argued that the short rate spread is correlated to some extent with
another explanatory variable, namely the forward rate spread discussed earlier on. In practice, how-
ever, the two display a modest correlation
15.
We are aware that the analytical background presented in this section is eclectic in nature. Like
all empirical studies of auctions, we cannot go beyond a list of qualitative hypotheses, and we clearly
resolve the trade-off between theoretical elegance and heuristic power in favour of the latter. None-
theless, we note that the ensuing predictions, with the significant exception of the effects of volatility,
are unambiguous and coherent among themselves.
3. Market and data
3.1 The auction
The MROs are liquidity-providing operations with a maturity of two weeks
16 that enable the
Eurosystem to resettle the desired amount of bank reserves once a week
17. The minimum bid rate is
established by the ECB’s Governing Council in its monetary policy meetings. Each bidder can sub-
mit up to ten bids. The Council also sets the rates on the two end-of-day standing facilities, marginal
lending and deposit, which delimit the “corridor” of short term interbank rates. In the sample period
the minimum MRO rate was raised from 4.25 to 4.50 percent on 31 August 2000 and up again to
                                                        
14  Although general collateral repos on the interbank market are the closest financial substitute for the
ECB repo, we take the 2-week overnight index swap rate as the key money market rate, like in other empirical
studies, because the latter contract is by far the most liquid in the euro area.
15  See footnote 22 for details.
16  Since March 2004 the maturity of MROs has been shortened to 1 week. As a consequence, the average
allotment amount has doubled compared to our sample period.
17  The low frequency of central bank interventions compared to other countries is made possible by the
large amount of the reserve requirement compared to the demand for settlement balances. The averaging provi-
sion on the former creates a liquidity buffer for banks’ daily liquidity management.15
4.75 percent on 5 October; it was then cut back to 4.50 percent on 10 May 2001 (see Figure 1). The
reserve maintenance period starts on the 24
th of each month and ends on the 23
rd of the following
month
18. The requirement must be fulfilled on the average of the end-of-day reserve account balances
of each bank and no carry-over is allowed from one period to the next
19.
The announcement of the auction takes place as a rule on Monday at 15:30, together with the
publication of the autonomous liquidity factors of the euro area, i.e. the forecast stock of items in the
Eurosystem balance sheet that cause a net absorption of bank reserves, like e.g. banknotes and gov-
ernment deposits. The published figure, covering a weekly horizon, enables the market to compute
the “neutral” amount of the auction and thus formulate a forecast on the allotment, the actual amount
of which is decided and announced by the ECB only ex post. The neutral amount is defined as the
amount of reserves that, based on past fulfilment and on the projected autonomous factors, would
bring the average reserve holdings one week ahead in line with the reserve requirement.
Bids may be submitted until 9:30 on Tuesday by any euro area bank presenting adequate op-
erational and financial standards. Out of the 7,000 credit institutions operating in the area during our
sample period, around 2,400 were eligible counterparties. In practice, in the 61 auctions covered by
our data set the actual number of bidders was way below the potential and showed a diminishing
trend, ranging between 798 and 240, as shown in Figure 2. In the sample period the total bid amount
ranged between 25 and 258 billion euro, with an average of 145 billion euro (Figure 3). The allot-
ment varied between 5 and 172 billion euro, with an average of 88 billion euro. The average bid-to-
cover ratio is equal to 1.65.
After the collection of bids by the NCBs, the ECB ranks all bids in descending rate order and
decides on the allotment. Bids below the marginal, or stop-out, rate are dropped; bids above the mar-
ginal rate win the auction, and bids at the stop-out rate are allotted pro-rata. The result of the auction
is published by the ECB on wire services at 11:20 on the auction day. The announcement gives the
total allotment, total bid amount, number of bidders, minimum and maximum bid rates, weighted av-
erage allotment rate, marginal rate and percentage of allotment at the margin. Settlement of the auc-
tion is on the day following the auction, i.e. normally on Wednesday.
The actual allotment tends to lie close to the neutral amount (ECB, 2002). The spread between
the marginal rate and the minimum rate was between 0 and 43 basis points, the difference between
                                                        
18  In March 2004 the cycle of the reserve maintenance period has been changed, making it start soon after
the monthly monetary policy meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council.
19  In order to make the requirement as neutral as possible to banks, minimum reserves are remunerated by
the Eurosystem at the average marginal rate of the MROs conducted in the maintenance period. Excess re-
serves are not remunerated, whereas deficiencies incur a financial penalty.16
the average allotment rate and the marginal rate was between 0 and 6 basis points (Figure 4). The
standard deviation ranged between 4 and 19 basis points for the bid rates, and between 4 and 18 basis
points for the allotment rates (Figure 5).
3.2 Data
In the empirical analysis we will consider the bidding behaviour of each bank, ignoring the
amounts allotted ex post by the ECB and the resulting rates. We do that because, as we pointed out
earlier, we are interested in the determinants of the demand for liquidity in the auctions, whereas the
allotments would reflect the preferences of the Eurosystem as well as those of bidders.
Figures 6a-c give the breakdown of the number of bidders by country. All countries show a
decreasing trend in the number of participants, although this phenomenon is more pronounced in
Germany, France, Italy and Austria. The country with the largest number of participants is by far
Germany, with 381 bidders per auction on average, followed by Italy (31), France (30), Luxembourg
(26), Spain (21), Austria (16), Ireland (9), the Netherlands (9), Belgium (8), Greece (5)
20, Portugal
(4) and Finland (2). The country shares of bidding are shown in Figures 7a-c.
We made some rearrangements on the raw data set of the individual bid schedules. First, we
omitted the bidders from Greece, which took part in the auctions only from January 2001 onwards.
Second, to avoid breaks in the time series of bid schedules, we aggregated the bid arrays of a small
number of bidders which merged at some stage in the sample period, thus treating them as if they had
been a single bidder from the start of the period. We thus ended up with 1032 bidders which took part
in at least one auction in the period between the switch to the variable rate tender and the end of our
sample. We note that in the following analysis we are forced to “sacrifice” the first two auctions of
that period. In fact, we need to retrieve one important explanatory variable, namely the maturing
amount for each bidder, which corresponds to the individual allotment amount of the MRO with two
lags. We do not know this variable for the first two auctions under the new format. However, from
the third auction onwards we are able to compute the maturing amount from the individual bidding
schedules and the information on the auction results. Hence the dataset that will be used in the em-
pirical analysis is made of 59 auctions.
The frequency of bidding is given in Table 2, which shows that 30 bidders, who bid at least
once in the first two auctions under the new format, dropped out of the group of bidders in the fol-
lowing 59 auctions. 199 bidders placed bids between 1 and 10 times, 169 placed bids between 11 and
                                                        
20  The figure for Greece refers to January-.August 2001.17
20 times, and so forth. The number of bidders which were present throughout the 59 auctions in the
sample is 25. Table 3 gives the distribution of the average bid size across auctions by active bidder,
i.e. including nonzero bids only. Bid size is expressed as a percentage of our scale variable, namely
the area reserve requirement
21. 260 bidders, the largest fraction, place bids which represent only one
hundredth of a percentage point or less of the area reserve requirement. Bidders with average bids
above 1 percent of the area requirement are 36.
Table 4 provides summary statistics on the variables that will be employed in the panel regres-
sions. For the variables that vary over time and across bidders (see the upper part of the table), we
give three rows of statistics. The first row refers to the overall sample, obtained by pooling all indi-
viduals and time periods. The “between” statistics (second row) are computed over the individual av-
erages. The “within” statistics are computed on the deviation from each individual’s average, where
the global mean is added back in to make the results comparable.
After auction participation (see Table 2), the second dependent variable is the individual bid
amount, as a percentage of the area requirement, with an overall mean value of 0.2249. The third de-
pendent variable is the weighted average bid rate, taken as a spread over the minimum bid rate set by
the ECB. Its overall mean value is 0.0547, i.e. over 5 basis points above the floor rate. The last de-
pendent variable is the weighted dispersion of bid rates, given by their standard deviation. Its overall
average is 0.0063, i.e. below 1 basis point, reflecting the fact that the majority of bidders does not
avail itself of the possibility to submit multiple bids in the auction, and uses just one or very few bids.
Indeed, we had a look at the overall frequency distribution of bid dispersion, and found that 35 per-
cent of the bids are single bids (with a nil dispersion), and an additional 45 percent show a dispersion
below 1 basis point.
Next we turn to the candidate explanatory variables. We do not have data on the individual re-
serve fulfilment of each bidder at the time of the auction, and our best proxy is the reserve fulfilment
ratio of the bidder’s country as of the day before the auction. The overall minimum and maximum are
59.22 and, respectively, 145.57.
The maturing amount of a bidder is equal on average to 0.0671 of the area requirement.
As concerns the bidder’s size, we have accurate data on each bidder’s reserve requirement
during the thirteen monthly maintenance periods, which we use as the measure of bidder size. Again,
we express this variable as a percentage of the area reserve requirement. The variable’s overall mean
                                                        
21  In the sample period the area requirement, which represents a relatively stable component of the sys-
tem’s liquidity need, was equal on average to 118.6 billion euro, with a minimum of 111.8 billion euro and a
maximum of 127.2 billion euro.18
is equal to 0.0623 percent of the aggregate requirement. The individual bidder’s size varies moder-
ately over time, as shown by the low value of the within standard deviation, equal to 0.0174, as op-
posed to a between standard deviation of 0.2197.
The remaining explanatory variables are all bidder invariant, and their summary statistics are
given in the bottom part of Table 4. The expected amount of the MRO has a mean value of 76.04
percent of the area reserve requirement.
The forward rate spread is given by the difference between the 2-week forward swap rate one
week ahead and the current 2-week rate. This spread captures the difference between the expectation
of the interest rate of the next MRO and that on the current MRO, and it measures the intertemporal
trade-off between consecutive auctions. Its mean value is –2.36 basis points, with a range between –
30 and +9 basis points.
The average short rate spread is defined as the difference between the 2-week EONIA swap
rate on the day before the auction and the minimum auction rate. Its mean value is equal to 7.17 basis
points, and it ranges between –6 and +45 basis points. The mean of the long rate spread, defined as
the difference between the 10-year Bund yield on the day before the auction and the minimum bid
rate, is equal to 41.07 basis points, and it ranges between –10 and +107 basis points
22.
We estimate short rate volatility using an ARCH(1) model on the daily series of the 2-week
swap rate, where the short rate is a function of its own lag and the conditional variance is a function
of the short rate spread plus dummy variables that capture calendar regularities and institutional fea-
tures of the euro area money market (see the Appendix for details). The resulting conditional vari-
ance on the auction day is equal on average to 0.0014.
We construct an explanatory variable taking the value 1 if the bank belongs to a bank group.
Among our bidders, we record 31 multinational banking groups with a minimum of 2 bidders and a
maximum of 6 bidders each. The bidders belonging to a group are 79 in total. Finally, in the list of
explanatory variables we include two other dummies. Both capture the increased likelihood that some
bidders may end up squeezed after the auction. The first one, called “Post underbidding”, is equal to
1 in the MRO that followed the underbidding episodes of 13 February and, respectively, 10 April
2001 (see ECB, 2001b). This dummy reflects the fact that, after those underbid auctions, bidders
feared that the ECB might have squeezed liquidity by providing an amount of refinancing below the
                                                        
22  The three interest rate explanatory variables show some degree of correlation, which in principle might
affect the precision of the regression estimates. It turns out that the correlation between the short spread and the
forward spread is equal to 0.13; the correlation between the short spread and the long spread is 0.51; the corre-
lation between the forward spread and the long spread is 0.37. In the presence of a degree of correlation that19
neutral value, as it indeed happened. The second dummy is a period-end dummy variable taking the
value 1 if the MRO is the last-to-be-settled in the maintenance period.
4. Estimation approach
From an econometric viewpoint, we are confronted with a problem of endogenous sample se-
lection in a panel framework with unobserved individual components. Our first equation of interest
concerns the decision to participate or not in the auction, which may be estimated using e.g. the pro-
bit or the logit model. This is usually called the selection equation, because it selects the sample in a
nonrandom fashion across individuals and over time. The selection process generates an unbalanced
panel data set: at any auction, we will observe the endogenous variables of interest (bid amount, rate
and dispersion) only for those individuals who choose to participate in the auction. These endoge-
nous variables are linked through the regression equations to (potentially) the same set of explana-
tory variables for the probability of bidding. We further assume that we are not able to track all indi-
vidual specific characteristics, that the unobserved components are time invariant and that they are
correlated with the explanatory variables. If the unobservable characteristics affecting the decision to
participate in the auction are correlated with the unobservable characteristics that determine the three
variables of interest, estimating the regression equations via standard fixed effects panel techniques
would yield biased and inconsistent results (see Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 17). We note that in a cross-
section framework, estimation in the presence of endogenous sample selection can be performed
relatively easily using the Heckman (1979) two-step approach. On the other hand, in a panel frame-
work the problem is complicated by the time dimension. Wooldridge (1995) provides a two-step
parametric approach for testing and correcting for selection bias in linear panel data models. The
method requires a standard probit regression for each time period followed by a fixed effects linear
regression. The errors in the selection equation are assumed to be normally distributed, but they are
allowed to display arbitrary serial correlation and unconditional heteroskedasticity
23.
The model for each of the three regression equations is as follows:
                                                                                                                                                                               
does not seem excessive among the three variables, and owing to the theoretical arguments in favour of their
inclusion, we prefer to keep all of them in the regressions.
23  Other approaches have also been proposed in the literature. In particular, Kyriazidou (1997) develops a
semiparametric method based on “differencing out” over time both the unobserved components and the sample
selection effect. Under alternative distributional assumptions, Rochina-Barrachina (1999) also develops a
method that exploits estimation in differences. The latter two methods are devised essentially for panel data
sets with a large number of individuals and a small number of observations. In our case, characterised by up to
59 observations for each individual, any estimation in differences would be extremely cumbersome, because it
would involve a large number of pairwise combinations.20
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In equation (1) we have omitted for simplicity the index that would distinguish the three vari-
ables of interest (equation 2 is valid for all of them). The symbol  t i x ,  denotes the 1 x K vector of ex-
planatory variables for each i and t;  β  is the K x 1 vector of interest;  i α  is the unobservable fixed
effect in the main equation;  i η  is the unobservable fixed effect and δ is the H x 1 vector of parame-
ters of the selection equation. The generic endogenous variable  t i y ,  is observed only  when  the  se-
lection  variable   1 , = t i h .  Selection bias  arises because  we allow  the conditional  mean  of  the  re-
siduals  in  the regression  equation  to  be linearly  correlated  with the error in the selection equa-
tion. This is formally expressed by  ( ) ( ) t i t i t i t i t i i t i v v u E v x u E , , , , , , | , , | ρ α = = .
For the variable describing the participation choice we have fitted a fixed effects panel probit
model by “brute force” using Newton’s method
24. The program is able to estimate the vector of the
structural parameters plus the N fixed effects because it takes advantage of the sparse structure with a
large diagonal submatrix of the Hessian matrix (we refer the interested reader to Greene, 2003). In
the regression equations for each of the three endogenous variables we have implemented the
Woooldridge’s two-step procedure as follows
25. Starting from the assumption of a linear correlation
between the errors of the selection equation and the errors of the regression equations, in the first step
the inverse Mills ratios (henceforth IMRs) for the selection equation are estimated. The IMRs are
achieved, for each time period  T t  , 1 = , by running a standard cross-section probit regression on the
following model:
(3)   t i T t T i t i t t i v x x h , , , 1 , 1 , 0 ,
*
, + + + + = δ δ δ  ,
where the IMR is defined as:
                                                        
24  We employed the algorithm available in LIMDEP, Version 8.
25  We have not found any off-the-shelf implementation of the Wooldridge method in any of the economet-
ric packages available to us. We have considered  the following: LIMDEP, RATS, STATA, EViews, Pc-GIVE,
and SAS. Professor Rochina-Barrachina kindly provided to us the GAUSS program that she had developed for
her joint paper with C. Dustmann of 2000. Taking advantage of this program, we developed the code for the
















() ⋅ φ  is the standard normal probability density function and  () ⋅ Φ  is the standard cumulative distribu-
tion function. By stacking the T different IMRs resulting from each probit regression we generate the
auxiliary regressor  () ' ' , , ' , ' 2 1 T λ λ λ λ  =  required to remove the sample selection bias
26. The final
step is a standard fixed effects regression on the set of all the variables  λ , x , to obtain a consistent
estimator of the vector of interest β . The model for this final step is as follows:
(4) N i T t u x y t i t i t i i t i   , 1 , 1 ˆ , , , , = = + + + = ρ λ β α ,
where  t i, ˆ λ  is built by stacking the IMRs estimated for each cross-section.
This modelling framework yields both a variable addition test and a correcting device for se-
lection bias. The hypothesis under test is  0 : 0 = ρ H , by means of the t-statistic for  ρˆ ; if the null hy-
pothesis is rejected then we would have sample selection bias by omitting the variable  t i, ˆ λ . As we
will see later on, for all three behavioural variables the coefficient of λ  displays a highly significant
value.
A final issue is the computation of asymptotically consistent () ∞ → N  standard errors for the
coefficients. When a fixed effects regression equation includes predictor-generated regressors, such
as our array of IMRs, the standard errors are generally inconsistent (see Pagan, 1984), because they
do not take into account the sampling variability of the predictor generated regressor. In order to
compute a consistent variance-covariance matrix we have implemented the sandwich estimator pro-
posed by Wooldridge (1995). Considering the vector  ( ) ρ β θ ˆ , ˆ ˆ=  of the structural parameters in the
main equation (4), we have  () ()() 1 1 ' ' ˆ var − − = X X B X X A θ , where the matrix X collects all the data
columns of the variables  λ , x  in the final fixed effects regression. Huber (1967) and White (1980)
have originally proposed this approach to obtain a robust estimator in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity. In our case the outer matrix is simply the variance-covariance matrix provided by the fixed ef-
fects regression, while the inner matrix B accounts for the presence of errors in the series of the IMR
variable estimated in the probit step. The matrix B is computed as the variance-covariance matrix of
                                                        
26  In our case, in the T auxiliary cross-section regressions required for the estimation of the IMRs we have
been forced to discard the bidder-invariant variables from the selection equation.22
the vector measuring the correlation with the residuals induced by the estimation of the IMRs (see the
Appendix of Wooldridge, 1995 for further details).
5. Results of the general model
5.1 Participation
We estimate the probability of bidding with a panel probit regression of the type:
(5) ( ) () δ η t i t i t i h , i ,
*
, x x 0 Pr + Φ = >  ,
where  *
,t i h  is the latent variable which underlies the decision to participate in the auction. We recall
that we have 1,032 bidders in the data set and 59 auctions.  t i, x  denotes the vector of explanatory
variables for bidder i at time t, including for notational simplicity the time series variables that do not
change across bidders and the dummy variables, and δ  is the coefficients vector. Equation (5) says
that the probability that a bidder participates in the auction is distributed as a standard normal and its
argument is a linear function of our explanatory variables plus the individual specific fixed effect.
The regression results are given in Table 5, column P. All the explanatory variables are highly
statistically significant. The country fulfilment ratio has a negative effect (-0.0077) on the probability
of entering the auction, as predicted by reserve management theory. In words, the larger is the cu-
mulative reserve position of banks in the bidder’s country on auction day, the lower is the probability
that each bidder will participate in the auction.
The forward rate spread has a positive effect on the likelihood of bidding, with a coefficient of
1.6285. This is again in line with the notion that bidders manage their reserves in an efficient manner.
When the forward rate is larger than its spot value, reflecting for instance the expectation of a mone-
tary policy hike in the following weeks, then more bidders enter the auction, and vice versa.
Short rate volatility has a negative and significant effect (-20.3052) on the probability of bid-
ding. This finding goes against the hypothesis that banks are risk averse and, facing an intertemporal
constraint on the minimum amount of reserves, they react to increased volatility on the cost of their
funding by bidding more actively. On the other hand, the negative coefficient would seem consistent
with the winner’s curse hypothesis.23
The coefficient estimate for the maturing MRO amount (1.1608) shows a direct effect on par-
ticipation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that bidders have a target for the level of end-of-day
reserves, related to the demand for settlement balances and the pursuit of a smooth fulfilment pattern.
The coefficients for the post underbidding dummy and the period end dummy are both positive
(0.2597 and, respectively, 0.0981). The sign of the coefficients is as expected, based on the hypothe-
sis that an increase in the likelihood of a short squeeze causes more bidders with a short position to
bid in the auction.
The bidder size has a positive effect on the likelihood of bidding (1.0059). This seems consis-
tent with the two-tier or transnational market hypothesis: other things equal, larger banks are more
likely to participate in the auction owing to their role as liquidity dealers in the domestic and cross-
border market.
The expected auction amount has a positive effect (0.0041) on the probability of bidding. We
had no clear a priori. This result may perhaps be interpreted in light of optimum reserve management.
The expected MRO amount is directly related to the perspective liquidity need of the banking system.
We have already included an explanatory variable, the fulfilment ratio, that captures the liquidity
need, although with a backward-looking orientation. The positive effect of the expected auction
amount may therefore reflect the entry of marginal bidders in the auction as the forward-looking li-
quidity imbalance increases.
The long rate spread has a direct effect (0.4884) on the probability of participating in the auc-
tion. This is clearly consistent with efficient collateral management, and suggests that marginal bid-
ders seek to ride the yield curve.
The short rate spread also has a direct effect (1.8815) on the probability of bidding, in line with
the notion that rate hike expectations attract more bidders in the primary market for liquidity.
5.2 Bid amount
The regression for the (scaled) individual bid amount is performed according to equation (4),
where  t i, x  is the vector of explanatory variables for the scaled bid amount  t i y ,  of bidder i in auction
t and β is the coefficients vector. The regression results are given in Table 5, column B.
The country fulfilment ratio affects inversely the bid amount (-0.0006), as expected.
The forward rate spread displays a negative effect on the bid amount (-0.0715), contrary to our
a priori. When the forward 2-week rate is larger than the spot rate, demand decreases. This seems at24
odds with the idea that the forward rate spread reflects rate change expectations. However, we note
that the spread is also mechanically linked to the very short term liquidity situation at the time of the
auction, in addition to more fundamental factors. Let’s take the example of a negative forward
spread, which is true on average and by a small amount (see Table 4). This might be viewed as the
result of a slightly tight liquidity situation today compared to what the market expects it to be in a
week’s time. If that is the case, then the coefficient estimate says that bidders demand more in the
current auction, possibly owing to quantity constraints, and give up the rate decrease that is priced in
the forward rate.
Interest rate volatility does not significantly contribute to explain demand in the auction.
The maturing auction amount has a positive and highly significant effect on bid amount. The
size of the coefficient (0.5391) implies that bidders tend to renew on average over one half of the
maturing auction amount. This finding lends further support to the hypothesis that bidders have a tar-
get level for end-of-day reserves.
The post underbidding dummy displays a positive effect on bid amount (0.0923), while the pe-
riod end dummy is not significant.
The coefficient of the bidder size variable is equal to 0.8472 and highly significant. Bearing in
mind that the size variable is given by the individual reserve requirement divided by the same scale
variable as the bid amount, this implies that on average each bidder demands in the auction an
amount corresponding to almost 85 per cent of his requirement.
The expected auction amount does not have a significant effect on the bid amount.
Consistently with the notion that bidders manage their collateral in an efficient manner, the
long rate spread has a positive effect on the bid amount (0.0714). When the long rate increases rela-
tive to the monetary policy rate, it becomes more convenient to hold or acquire collateral and thus
participate in the auction, compared to the alternative of borrowing in the unsecured market.
The short rate spread also significantly affects the bid amount, with the expected sign (0.1280).
This finding lends support to the prediction that bidders demand is elastic to short term rate expecta-
tions.
Finally, the λ  variable (0.0343) is highly significant, revealing the presence of a sample se-
lection effect.
5.3 Average bid rate25
The regression for the bid rate is carried out using equation (4), where  t i, x  is the vector of ex-
planatory variables for the average bid rate  t i y ,  of bidder i in auction t and β is the new coefficients
vector. The regression results are given in Table 5, column R. With the exception of bidder size, all
coefficient estimates are highly significant. As we would expect, the most significant variable is by
far the short rate spread, which guides bidders’ choices. Controlling for the other decision variables,
the coefficient (0.7691) implies that on average bidders shade their bids below market rates, and
“shift” on the bid rate slightly over three quarters of the 2-week money market rate spread over the
minimum auction rate
27.
 The fulfilment ratio has a negative effect (-0.0001), as predicted on the basis of optimising
behaviour on the part of bidders. When the liquidity position is large, bidders shade their bids more,
and vice versa.
The forward rate spread has a positive effect (0.0060), implying that bidders raise the bid rate
when the spot market rate is low compared to its expected value at the next auction. This finding is
also consistent with the notion that bidders behave efficiently.
Short rate volatility has a positive effect on the bid rate (2.7412). This finding would seem
consistent with bidders’ risk aversion and the loser’s nightmare hypothesis.
The maturing MRO amount has a positive effect on the bid rate (0.0041). This lends additional
support to the hypothesis that bidders have a target level of reserves in their decision process, and
they are prepared to pay a price for it.
The two dummies for the likelihood of a liquidity squeeze provide apparently mixed signals.
The post underbidding dummy shows a negative effect on bid rates (-0.0213), while the period end
dummy has a positive effect (0.0060). Our interpretation is that, since after an underbidding episode
the market rate rapidly rises, and the bid rate is linked to the market rate through the short rate
spread, underbidding provides leeway for some degree of bid shading compared to the average be-
haviour.
The bidder size affects negatively the bid rate (-0.0035), although the effect is not statistically
significant.
The expected MRO amount exerts a negative effect on the bid rate (-0.0002). This effect is
consistent with the cost of collateral hypothesis.
                                                        
27  This is a downward biased estimate, which ignores the effect of the relatively few instances in which
money market rates were below the policy rate.26
The effect of the long rate spread on bid rates is negative (-0.0101). Our interpretation is that,
as collateral becomes cheaper and more bidders enter into play (see section 5.1), the marginal bidders
are less liquidity constrained than the “core” bidders, thus pushing bid rates down.
The  λ  variable (0.0078) is highly significant, implying again the presence of a sample selec-
tion effect.
5.4 Bid rate dispersion
The regression for bid rate dispersion is based on equation (4), where  t i, x  is the vector of ex-
planatory variables for rate dispersion  t i y ,  of bidder i in auction t and β is the new coefficients vec-
tor. The regression results are given in Table 5, column D. All coefficient estimates are highly sig-
nificant. The extremely large values of the t statistics are related to the low degree of variation in bid
rate dispersion, as we noted in section 3.2, and to the use of fixed effects. In other words, if a given
bidder submits, say, 2 bids that differ by 2 basis points in one auction, it is likely that he will submit
2 bids differing by 2 basis points in any other auction.
The country fulfilment ratio has a positive effect on bid rate dispersion (2.E-5). This implies
that as the liquidity position becomes more comfortable, each bidder tends to make a broader use of
the possibility to submit multiple bids.
The forward rate spread also has a positive effect on dispersion (0.0012).
Based on auction theory, we predicted that short rate volatility will induce bidders to disperse
more. This hypothesis is confirmed by the positive sign of the coefficient for market rate volatility
(0.0158).
The maturing auction amount displays a positive effect on bid dispersion (0.0006). We record
this finding, although we had no a priori on this relationship.
The likelihood of a short liquidity squeeze, captured by the two dummy variables, increases
bid rate dispersion. We note that the effect of an underbidding episode on dispersion (0.0049) is
around ten times as large as the “normal” effect at the end of each maintenance period (0.0005).
Large bidders disperse rates more, as shown by the positive coefficient for the bidder size
(0.0025). This seems consistent with the notion that large bidders behave more efficiently.
The cost of collateral hypothesis implies a positive effect of the expected MRO amount on rate
dispersion. This is confirmed by our regression coefficient (2.E-6).27
The long rate spread has a positive effect on bid rate dispersion (0.0006).
Our last hypothesis was that an increase in the short rate spread should induce bidders to dis-
perse more. This is confirmed by our coefficient estimate (0.0305).
The  λ  variable (-0.0004) is highly significant, showing the presence of a sample selection ef-
fect.
6. Country effects
We extend the basic model presented in section 4 by introducing the interaction of country
dummies, denoted by  c d , with each explanatory variable. For simplicity we omit the analysis of bid
rate dispersion, owing to its scarce variability, as well as the interactions of the two dummies that
capture the likelihood of a short squeeze.
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The first part of the right-hand side of equation (6) is like that in equation (5), while the double
summation term constructs the country interactions and the γ ’s are the country effects to be esti-
mated. For the model’s identification we take German bidders, representing the prevalent group, as
our baseline (captured by the δ ’s) and omit the interaction of the variables with the country dummy
for Germany. We thus have j running from 1 (country fulfilment ratio) to 8 (short rate spread), while
the country index c runs from 1 to 10.
Analogously, we investigate the country effects on the bid amount and the average bid rate
using the following extension of equation (4):
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Table 6 provides the regression results of equation (6), whereas Tables 7 and 8 give the results
for the bid amount and, respectively, the average bid rate based on equation (7). We rank the country
dummies in alphabetical order as follows: AT (Austria), BE (Belgium), ES (Spain), FI (Finland), FR28
(France), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), LU (Luxembourg), NL (the Netherlands), PT (Portugal). The aver-
age behaviour of German bidders is given by the non interacted terms. The behaviour of bidders from
any other country can be computed as the sum of the baseline coefficient (δ or  β , if significant)
plus the coefficient of the relevant interaction (γ  or φ , if significant). In very general terms, we ob-
serve a large number of significant coefficients: taking the 5 percent confidence level, the count of
significant coefficients is 48 (out of 88) in Table 6, 52 in Table 7, 55 in Table 8. We again find ex-
tremely significant values of λ .
To improve the readability of our results, in Table 9 we report the significant effects only for
the three equations, providing for each country different from DE the total effect of each variable.
Therefore, rather than looking in detail at Tables 6-8, we move to the comparative table and examine
the main effects of each explanatory variable across the three equations of interest.
Starting with the effect of volatility, we note that bidders from FR, IT, LU, NL and PT share
with bidders from DE a “moderate” negative impact on participation, equal to –15.6062. On the other
hand, the impact is from 3 to 5 times larger for bidders from AT, BE, ES, FI and IE. This points to a
larger fear of the winner’s curse in the latter group of countries.
The explanatory variable which reveals the largest number of country variations is the matur-
ing amount of refinancing. In terms of the participation decision, taking as a benchmark the coeffi-
cient for DE, equal to around 1, we observe that almost all countries display a larger effect. This
reaches a maximum in the case of FR, with a coefficient roughly equal to 7. However, in terms of bid
amount we note that the country which demands the largest fraction of the amount on expiry is DE
(0.5669), followed by ES, IE and IT, all of which have a coefficient above 0.5. The countries which
are prepared to pay the highest price in terms of bid rate to renew their amount of refinancing are BE,
ES and FI, with coefficients in the range 0.0046-0.0055. At the other extreme , the countries with the
lowest values are AT, IE and IT, with coefficients in the range 0.0003-0.0005.
The effect of bidder size is mostly diversified when looking at the equation for the bid amount.
The largest coefficients are obtained in the case of DE (3.6253) and ES (8.0132). This is suggestive
of the idea that in these countries, more than elsewhere, a two-tier structure is present in the domestic
money market.
An increase in the long rate spread has the largest impact on auction participation in the case of
BE (1.0050) and LU (0.8678). This is not surprising, since in those countries a large amount of rela-
tively cheap collateral is available, and marginal bidders may find it convenient to enter the auction
with the main aim of riding the yield curve. In terms of bid amount, the biggest impact is observed
for ES (0.2014) and FI (0.2675). Furthermore, in those two countries the degree of bid shading re-29
sulting from the bid rate equation, and associated with an increase in the long rate spread, is on the
low side in absolute value (-0.0041 for ES and –0.0065 for FI, compared to –0.0113 for DE). If we
take the view that the long rate spread is an inverse measure of collateral cost, then the above find-
ings suggest that ES and FI are the countries where such cost may be more binding.
Finally, we turn to the effects of the short rate spread. In terms of the probability of bidding,
three countries distinguish themselves from the rest. ES displays the largest coefficient (3.9343)
while, at the other extreme, FR and LU have the lowest coefficients (0.3567 and, respectively,
0.2874). Interestingly, we note that each country has specific preferences in terms of bid shading
compared to money market rates. The ones which pursue bid shading to the largest extent are ES
(with a coefficient of 0.7053) and FI (with a coefficient of 0.6444). Then come AT (with a coefficient
of 0.7470) and IT (0.7464). At the other end BE, LU and NL apply bid shading to the lowest degree,
with coefficients in the range 0.8403-0.8684).
7. Size effects
In this section we restrict our data sample to two groups of bidders. The first group includes all
bidders in the lowest two deciles ranked by size, the second group includes all bidders in the highest
two deciles by size. We thus specialise the basic regressions (5) and (4) taking the “small” as the
baseline case and interacting a Large bidder dummy (LBD), equal to 1 if the bidder belongs to the
second group, with each of the explanatory variables (except the liquidity squeeze dummies). In the
case of bidders’ participation the equation is as follows:
(8) ( ) () φ LBD x x x 0 Pr t i, t i, i ,
*
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We estimate equation (8) by means of a fixed effects panel probit regression. Analogously, we
modify equation (4) to obtain:
(9) t i t i t i i t i e y , , , , χ LBD x β x + ⋅ ⋅ + + =α .
We estimate equation (9) for each of the three endogenous variables bid amount, rate and dis-
persion by means of the Wooldridge two-step procedure.
The results of equations (8) and (9) are given in Table 10. The large bidders display a number
of significant differences compared to the small ones. While the effect of country reserve fulfilment30
on dispersion is positive for the small (0.0001), it becomes nil for the large. Interestingly, when vola-
tility is high the small bidders withdraw from the auction (with a coefficient of –4.9417 in the P col-
umn) at a relatively low rate compared to the large bidders (with a differential coefficient of –
33.4189).
The maturing amount of refinancing is not an important factor in the participation decision for
the big bidders as opposed to the small ones, since we note that the differential effect for the former
(-3.4338) almost cancels out the baseline effect for the latter (4.0431). However the same variable
induces large bidders to demand slightly more in the auction (0.0379 in addition to a baseline coeffi-
cient of 0.5173, from column B), at lower average rates (-0.0022 plus 0.0057, from column R), and
with a larger dispersion of bids (0.0001 plus 0.0003, from column D).
The individual size affects directly the decision to participate for small bidders (205.7991),
while it is unimportant for the large ones (with an offset of -205.2501). Compared to the small bid-
ders, the large ones respond to, e.g., an increase in the long rate spread by increasing their demand
more (0.1627 in addition to 0.0540), by shading their bids more (-0.0017 in addition to –0.0073) and
by dispersing more (0.0007 plus 0.0003). Finally, the large bidders shade their bids less relative to
the short term spread (with a differential effect of 0.0625 on top of 0.7215 for the small bidders).
These findings point to the following conclusions. First, while large bidders are more reactive
to an increase in volatility, their participation is otherwise more stable than that of small bidders, and
the latter are thus more likely to have withdrawn from the MROs over our sample period. Second,
large bidders seem less risk averse than small bidders, probably on account of their better access to
the money market. Third, it appears that collateral is managed more efficiently by large bidders, also
because they make a better use of the possibility to submit multiple bids. Fourth, large bidders set the
average bid rate closer to the money market rate.
8. Bank group effects
In order to investigate the effects of participation in a banking group, we extract in the first
place the sample of the 79 bidders that belong to a group (we will refer to them as the group bidders).
Second, to construct a control sample, for each group bidder we extract another bidder not belonging
to a group, from the same country and with similar size (we will call those in the second sample the
single bidders). Next we construct a Bank group dummy (BGD), equal to 1 in the case of group bid-
ders and to 0 for single bidders. We then run the participation probit using equation (8) above, where
we replace the variable LBD with the BGD dummy. Similarly, we examine bid amount, rate and dis-
persion by means of equation (9) with the same replacement.31
Table 11 gives the empirical estimates. Interestingly, we note that volatility shows an effect
not revealed by the previous estimates. Namely, volatility has a negative impact on the bid amount,
equal to –10.8940 in the case of single  bidders and augmented  in absolute value   by  –20.9629 for
group bidders. This seems to indicate that group bidders are responsive to the winner’s curse, a phe-
nomenon that was not statistically significant in the regression of the previous section. However,
group bidders also increase the bid rate when volatility is high (with a differential effect of 0.4925
compared to the baseline of 2.8029, from column R).
Group bidders demand in the auction a larger proportion of the amount on expiry (with a coef-
ficient of 0.1381 in addition to a baseline of 0.4196, from column B) and are less keen on  paying a
price for  the renewal  of  the operation (with a  differential  coefficient of –0.0019 compared to a
baseline effect of 0.0041, from column R).
The positive effect of size on bid amount, which we found in the estimate of the general
model, is particularly strong for group bidders (2.0590, to be added to –0.5393 of the baseline).
Group bidders significantly increase demand in the auction when the expected MRO amount
increases (with a differential effect of 0.0006), while single bidders show a negative effect. Finally,
in analogy with the evidence for large bidders of the previous section, we find that group bidders sig-
nificantly increase their demand in the auction when the long rate spread increases (with a differen-
tial effect equal to 0.1004 on top of the baseline coefficient equal to 0.1720).
In the case of the participation decision, the main effect is the lower responsiveness of group
bidders to the expected size of the auction (-0.0035 in addition to 0.0050, from column P). At the
same time, when the latter increases group bidders disperse more than single bidders (with a differ-
ential coefficient equal to 2.2E-5 compared to a baseline value hardly distinguishable from 0).
Two findings provide an argument in favour of the transnational bank hypothesis. First, group
bidders demand in the auction an amount of reserves that is equal to roughly 1.5 times their reserve
requirement (i.e. the size variable) against an average for the entire population of 0.8 (from Table 5).
Second, unlike single bidders, group bidders increase their demand when the expected auction
amount increases. This clearly indicates that they are set to act as brokers of the Eurosystem liquidity
provision towards the rest of the banking system. However, when volatility increases group bidders
are ready to lower the bid amount and, at the same time, they bid the rate up. Finally, we note that
group bidders pursue efficiency in the management of collateral, through their responsiveness to
changes in the slope of the yield curve and, hence, in collateral cost.32
9. Conclusion
We formulated an analytical framework for the decision to participate in the Eurosystem refi-
nancing auctions and the three variables that characterise individual bidding behaviour. Our findings
generally support the hypotheses derived from reserve management theory. In particular, the reserve
fulfilment ratio has an inverse impact on participation, amount and bid rate. The forward rate spread
affects positively the decision to participate and the bid rate. Interest rate volatility shows mixed ef-
fects. An increase in volatility reduces auction participation but, at the same time, pushes bid rates
up. Hence, marginal bidders are sensitive to the winner’s curse and display a low risk aversion, as re-
vealed by their exit from the auction when volatility increases; at the same time, “core” bidders seem
to have a larger degree of risk aversion, shown by their willingness to bid rates up when volatility is
high. The individual amount on expiry exerts a positive effect on all variables, supporting the hy-
pothesis that banks have a target level of end-of-day reserves for settlement purposes or due to the
preference for a smooth fulfilment pattern.
Based on auction theory, we included two indicator variables reflecting the increased likeli-
hood of a liquidity squeeze in the interbank market. These variables generally display the predicted
effects on participation, bid amount and dispersion. An additional underpinning of the model was
provided by the transnational bank hypothesis of Freixas-Holthausen, according to which larger
banks with a multinational profile use their informational advantage to arbitrage out the differences
in interest rates across countries. This feature would induce transnational banks to participate and bid
in the auction above the rest of banks. Indeed, the results of the general model show that the bidder
size has a positive effect on both the likelihood of bidding and the amount. The finding that the ex-
pected auction amount has a negative effect on bid rates, and that the long rate spread displays a
positive effect on participation and bid amount, both support the view that bidders seek to make an
efficient use of collateral.
Our results show the presence of national patterns in auction participation and bidding, which
may to a large extent be attributed to differences in the structure of domestic money markets. The
cost and availability of collateral also play an important role. Our analytical framework helped us in-
terpret these patterns. Broadly speaking, we can safely dismiss the idea that bidders’ behaviour is
homogeneous across the euro area in favour of a more diversified view.
We sought to test whether two important bidder attributes, size and participation in a banking
group, are powerful enough to characterise auction participation and bidding across the national bor-
ders. The answer from our evidence is affirmative. Auction participation by large bidders and group
bidders is more stable over time compared to small bidders and, respectively, single bidders. How-33
ever, when volatility increases the former two groups withdraw more swiftly from the auctions, on
account of their better access to the money market. Group bidders demand larger amounts in the auc-
tion, thus showing their attitude to act as liquidity brokers towards the rest of the banking system.
Large bidders and group bidders manage their collateral more efficiently, as revealed by their supe-
rior ability to ride the yield curve and submit multiple bids. The latter findings provide additional
support for the view that group bidders are able to play a multinational role.
Our findings have important implications on the issue of integration in the money market of
the euro area. In the first place, the documented relevance of microeconomic collateral management
suggests that the future introduction of the single list, by creating a level playing field in terms of
collateral availability and cost, will foster the integration of bidders’ behaviour in the repo auctions.
Second, we showed the peculiar role of large banks and group banks and provided clear arguments in
favour of the transnational bank hypothesis. The existence of efficient, multinational liquidity bro-
kers, in addition to a larger mass of medium and small players, is an extra market factor that will
promote integration in the euro money market.
Along with the empirical results, the analytical framework and the methodology adopted in
this paper lend themselves as a reference for future analyses of bidding in the Eurosystem repo auc-
tions, when new developments will suggest the opportunity to re-examine the performance of the
primary segment of the euro money market. We refer in particular to changes in the composition of
the collateral pool, further advances in the concentration of the banking industry and the enlargement
of the monetary union.34
Appendix - The ARCH model for interest rate volatility
The empirical literature abounds in the choice of alternative specifications for the volatility of
interest rates. E.g., in the case of the US federal funds rate, Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (2000) adopt
an EGARCH(1,1) model. Our problem is to estimate the daily conditional variance of the 2-week
EONIA swap rate.
We considered the ARCH(1) as the obvious candidate model, and started with a specification
search on the explanatory variables for the conditional mean and variance of the 2-week rate. This
led to the estimates presented in Table 12. As concerns the conditional mean equation, the lagged rate
enters with coefficient 1 and we could not find any other significant and plausible explanatory vari-
able, consistently with the hypothesis that the rate follows a martingale process. Conditional variance
is positively affected in the first place by the short rate spread, with a coefficient of 3.503, which we
took with one lag to avoid simultaneous endogeneity problems. Then we included dummy variables
that capture calendar regularities and institutional features of the euro area money market. The first
such dummy takes the value 1 on the days of the monetary meetings of the ECB’s Governing Coun-
cil and 0 otherwise, and it affects positively (with a coefficient of +3.142) the interest rate variance,
as expected. The dummy Negative MRO is equal to 1 on auction day if the lagged short spread is
negative, i.e. when the probability of underbidding is positive. The risk of underbidding has a posi-
tive effect on variance (3.962), as expected. The Post underbidding dummy takes the value 1 after the
occurrence of an underbidding episode. This dummy has a positive effect (1.606), although lower
than that of the ex ante dummy. The Last-in-month and Second-last-in-month dummies take value 1
on the last and, respectively, the second last working day of the month. They have a technical nature,
related to month-end increases in the demand for short term funds for regulatory purposes. Their co-
efficients present mixed signs, showing that uncertainty on the interest rate is overall relieved on the
last day of the month. The Second-last in period dummy is equal to 1 on the second last day of the
maintenance period. This dummy has a positive effect (0.936) on variance. The dummy for the last
day of the period turned out to be insignificant. Finally, the ARCH coefficient is equal to 0.290. All
estimates are highly significant.
In the specification search for conditional variance we tried the inclusion of additional ex-
planatory variables and calendar dummies, which turned out insignificant. We also tried variations of
the ARCH model, like an ARCH(2) specification, the inclusion of an AR(1) term, a GARCH(1,1)
model, an EGARCH(1,1) model, and so on. In most cases the alternative specifications did not con-
verge. In the remaining cases the estimates led to rejection of the alternative specifications.Tables and FiguresTable 1
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
 
This table summarises the predicted effects on bank’s participation and bidding in the Eurosystem auctions dis-
cussed in section 2.2. The hypotheses are derived from the reserve management models, unless otherwise
specified. The symbol (a) stands for auction theory, (b) stands for the transnational bank hypothesis, (c) is the
cost of collateral hypothesis, (d) stands for monetary policy expectations.
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0 30 2.91 2.91
1-10 199 19.28 22.19
11-20 169 16.38 38.57
21-30 153 14.83 53.39
31-40 138 13.37 66.76
41-50 155 15.02 81.78
51-58 163 15.79 97.58
59 25 2.42 100
Total 1032 100
Table 3
DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE BID SIZE BY ACTIVE BIDDER
Range No. of
bidders Percent Cum
< 0.01 260 25.95 25.95
0.01-0.025 179 17.86 43.81
0.025-0.05 162 16.17 59.98
0.05-0.075 91 9.08 69.06
0.075-0.1 50 4.99 74.05
0.1-0.25 130 12.97 87.03
0.25-0.5 64 6.39 93.41
0.5-0.75 23 2.30 95.71
0.75-1 7 0.70 96.41
> 1 36 3.59 100.0
Total 1002 100.0Table 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS
The variables Bid amount, Expected MRO amount, Bidder size and Maturing amount are all expressed as a per-
centage of the area reserve requirement. Volatility is given by the conditional variance of the 2-week swap rate
estimated with the ARCH model. The Average bid rate, Short rate spread and Long rate spread are differences
with respect to the minimum auction rate set by the ECB. The Country fulfilment ratio is in percentage of the
country reserve requirement.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Observations
Bid amount overall 0.2249 0.6373 0.0008 18.19 N =   29820
between 0.4223 0.0008 5.76 n =    1002
within 0.3390 -4.8483 12.66 T-bar = 29.7605
Average bid rate overall 0.0547 0.0708 0 0.65 N =   29820
between 0.0283 0 0.38 n =    1002
within 0.0688 -0.1203 0.65 T-bar = 29.7605
Bid rate dispersion overall 0.0063 0.0082 0 0.28 N =   29820
between 0.0051 0 0.05 n =    1002
within 0.0072 -0.0261 0.27 T-bar = 29.7605
Ctry fulfilment ratio overall 98.9932 5.7360 59.2200 145.57 N =   60888
between 2.2174 92.9534 108.73 n =    1032
within 5.2905 57.9944 141.55 T =      59
Maturing amount overall 0.0671 0.3212 0 17.88 N =   60888
between 0.2296 0 3.51 n =    1032
within 0.2246 -3.4387 14.44 T =      59
Bidder size overall 0.0623 0.2203 0 3.29 N =   60888
between 0.2197 0 2.92 n =    1032
within 0.0174 -0.4841 0.63 T =      59
Exp MRO amount 76.04 27.01 -3.59 152.04 59
Forward rate spread -0.0236 0.0626 -0.30 0.09 59
Volatility 0.0014 0.0027 4.E-05 0.0115 59
Long rate spread 0.4107 0.3346 -0.1 1.07 59
Short rate spread 0.0717 0.0847 -0.06 0.45 59Table 5
GENERAL MODEL:  PROBABILITY OF BIDDING,
BID AMOUNT, AVERAGE BID RATE AND BID RATE DISPERSION
Probability
 of bidding
Bid amount Average bid rate Bid rate dispersion
PB R D
Coef  t stat Coef  t stat Coef  t stat Coef  t stat
Ctry fulfilment ratio -0.0077 -6.16 -0.0006 -2.91 -0.0001 -24.29 2.E-05 454.5
Forward rate spread 1.6285 12.81 -0.0715 -25.06 0.0060 89.90 0.0012 1528.9
Short rate volatility -20.3052 -7.51 -5.2195 -0.82 2.7412 18.01 0.0158 9.2
Maturing MRO amt 1.1608 19.67 0.5391 560.60 0.0041 219.65 0.0006 2606.8
Post underb dummy 0.2597 4.96 0.0923 3.46 -0.0213 -33.45 0.0049 676.2
Period end dummy 0.0981 5.74 0.0001 0.01 0.0060 44.37 0.0005 353.4
Bidder size 1.0059 2.38 0.8472 4.66 -0.0035 -0.81 0.0025 51.5
Expected MRO amt 0.0041 13.38 0.0000 -0.11 -0.0002 -115.54 2.E-06 98.1
Long rate spread 0.4884 19.44 0.0714 35.66 -0.0101 -211.53 0.0006 1076.8
Short rate spread 1.8815 19.08 0.1280 4.68 0.7691 1177.87 0.0305 4120.2
Lambda 0.0343 16.57 0.0078 158.55 -0.0004 -750.7
No of obs 60888 29820 29820 29820
No of groups 1032 1002 1002 1002
Obs per group:     min 1 1 1
  avg 29.8 29.8 29.8
   m a x 5 95 95 9
R squared:        within 0.2468 0.8007 0.1808
                     between 0.7471 0.5161 0.0332
                        overall 0.6097 0.7781 0.1365
F(11,28807) 858.23 10518.80 577.88
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000Table 6
COUNTRY EFFECTS
PROBABILITY OF BIDDING
Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat.
Ctry fulfilment ratio -0.0128 -6.183 Bidder size -0.0441 -0.04
AT 0.0215 2.216 AT -23.4937 -2.375
BE 0.0185 2.146 BE -2.4719 -0.572
ES 0.0160 2.814 ES -2.3369 -0.749
FI -0.0096 -1.675 FI 1.4176 0.708
FR 0.0138 2.503 FR -6.4112 -0.986
IE 0.0076 1.732 IE 5.3478 1.64
IT 0.0116 2.637 IT -5.8323 -1.743
LU 0.0075 1.549 LU 0.8734 0.71
NL 0.0094 1.375 NL 4.5873 2.046
PT 0.0073 0.68 PT 11.4254 3.165
Forward rate spread 2.0070 13.724 Exp MRO amount 0.0039 11.209
AT -2.3586 -3.078 AT -0.0031 -1.739
BE -1.8131 -1.577 BE 0.0003 0.118
ES -1.7353 -2.888 ES 0.0028 1.975
FI -0.6711 -1.178 FI 0.0038 2.861
FR -2.8472 -3.523 FR -0.0027 -1.492
IE -1.1405 -2.217 IE 0.0013 1.106
IT -1.6378 -2.672 IT -0.0028 -2.04
LU -2.1336 -2.637 LU 0.0022 1.193
NL 0.2601 0.233 NL 0.0002 0.067
PT -0.1025 -0.072 PT -0.0029 -0.917
Volatility -15.6062 -4.962 Long rate spread 0.4791 16.165
AT -38.2051 -2.271 AT 0.0165 0.093
BE -59.6205 -2.163 BE 0.5260 2.033
ES -31.5907 -2.156 ES 0.1677 1.272
FI -31.3766 -2.383 FI 0.2077 1.682
FR -15.9462 -0.866 FR -0.5755 -3.251
IE -25.9069 -2.211 IE 0.0066 0.057
IT -0.2477 -0.019 IT 0.1165 0.862
LU 31.2321 1.763 LU 0.3887 2.164
NL 1.7301 0.062 NL -0.0857 -0.355
PT 0.9886 0.028 PT -0.1034 -0.321
Maturing amount 0.9950 12.97 Short rate spread 1.8913 16.291
AT 1.3251 2.46 AT -0.3213 -0.476
BE -0.6296 -2.768 BE 0.7694 0.752
ES 0.2898 1.132 ES 2.0430 3.751
FI 0.0395 0.156 FI -0.4822 -0.999
FR 5.8772 9.24 FR -1.5346 -2.326
IE 1.1930 4.404 IE -0.1318 -0.299
IT 1.2956 4.457 IT -0.6931 -1.339
LU -0.8054 -4.553 LU -1.6039 -2.532
NL 1.8383 2.213 NL 1.4840 1.625
PT 2.3538 2.189 PT 0.0274 0.022
Post underb dummy 0.2490 4.682
Period end dummy 0.1096 6.314
. No of obs 60888Table 7
COUNTRY EFFECTS
BID AMOUNT
Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat.
Ctry fulfilment ratio 0.0004 1.11 Bidder size 3.6253 10.18 No of obs 29820
AT -0.0027 -2.25 AT -2.6967 -3.20 No of groups 1002
BE -0.0054 -2.42 BE -2.0626 -2.38 Obs per group:
ES -0.0031 -3.20 ES 4.3879 6.47 Min 1
FI -0.0020 -1.86 FI -4.7940 -11.73 Avg 29.8
FR -0.0003 -0.17 FR -4.2420 -0.94 Max 59
IE 0.0002 0.43 IE -2.4140 -4.48 R squared:
IT -0.0005 -0.72 IT -4.9843 -6.89 Within 0.2767
LU -0.0009 -2.55 LU -3.9455 -9.86 Between 0.3913
NL -0.0013 -0.26 NL -3.7133 -22.57 Overall 0.3467
PT -0.0009 -0.36 PT -2.9098 -1.88
Forward rate spread -0.0899 -2.81 Exp MRO amount -0.0002 -23.80 F(91,28727) 120.79
AT 0.0752 1.04 AT 0.0002 14.01 Prob > F 0.0000
BE -0.8910 -6.79 BE 0.0041 18.85
ES -0.2801 -2.99 ES 0.0004 11.61
FI -0.0219 -0.34 FI 0.0014 31.93
FR 0.0962 0.47 FR 0.0001 4.25
IE 0.0059 0.10 IE 0.0004 9.10
IT -0.1041 -2.01 IT 0.0004 12.86
LU 0.1972 0.92 LU 0.0008 5.87
NL 0.1961 0.33 NL 0.0002 5.04
PT 0.3656 0.43 PT 0.0008 75.46
Volatility -3.6711 -0.83 Long rate spread 0.0373 20.03
AT -2.0010 -0.13 AT 0.0193 4.05
BE -54.3155 -1.25 BE 0.0088 1.84
ES -5.6094 -0.34 ES 0.1641 21.88
FI -13.5325 -1.04 FI 0.2303 31.68
FR 2.3021 0.09 FR -0.0368 -48.35
IE 0.1691 0.02 IE 0.0835 19.31
IT -0.0894 -0.01 IT 0.0613 7.60
LU -11.7828 -0.46 LU 0.0903 13.39
NL 1.8825 0.02 NL -0.0592 -1.40
PT -4.0887 -0.03 PT -0.0626 -0.69
Maturing amount 0.5669 382.27 Short rate spread 0.0781 6.81
AT -0.3002 -43.38 AT -0.0790 -1.73
BE -0.3073 -68.87 BE 0.2264 5.20
ES -0.0425 -28.74 ES 0.1660 0.00
FI -0.1846 -224.04 FI 0.4614 13.47
FR -0.1819 -2.59 FR 0.0247 0.00
IE -0.0140 -7.47 IE 0.2283 9.92
IT -0.0348 -51.34 IT 0.0209 0.62
LU -0.3691 -86.27 LU -0.2076 -2.19
NL -0.3409 -4.56 NL -0.0178 -0.07
PT -0.7623 -5.84 PT -0.1238 -0.85
Post underb dummy 0.0850 18.85 Lambda -0.0145 -187.13
Period end dummy -0.0017 -1.99Table 8
COUNTRY EFFECTS
AVERAGE BID RATE
Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat.
Ctry fulfilment ratio -0.0001 -5.73 Bidder size -0.0491 -1.91 No of obs 29820
AT -0.0002 -2.63 AT 0.1330 2.18 No of groups 1002
BE 0.0002 1.37 BE 0.1488 2.37 Obs per group:
ES 0.0009 13.43 ES 0.0514 1.05 Min 1
FI 0.0004 5.49 FI 0.0307 1.04 Avg 29.8
FR -0.0006 -4.33 FR 0.0288 0.09 Max 59
IE -0.0007 -18.56 IE -0.0497 -1.27 R squared:
IT 0.0003 5.70 IT 0.0643 1.23 Within 0.8036
LU 0.0001 2.37 LU 0.0718 2.48 Between 0.2636
NL 0.0005 1.34 NL -0.0482 -4.10 Overall 0.6143
PT 0.0003 1.60 PT 0.1951 1.74
Forward rate spread -0.0027 -1.19 Exp MRO amount -0.0002 -391.08 F(91,28727) 1291.29
AT -0.0082 -1.57 AT -8.E-6 -7.05 Prob > F 0.0000
BE -0.0679 -7.14 BE -0.0001 -3.51
ES -0.0518 -7.63 ES -0.0001 -24.45
FI -0.0491 -10.65 FI -0.0001 -18.81
FR 0.0176 1.18 FR 0.0001 72.20
IE -0.0257 -5.87 IE 2.E-5 5.56
IT 0.0040 1.08 IT 3.E-6 1.26
LU -0.0964 -6.19 LU -0.0001 -11.94
NL -0.0744 -1.73 NL -0.0002 -79.60
PT -0.0376 -0.61 PT -1.E-5 -12.88
Volatility 2.9410 9.22 Long rate spread -0.0113 -82.37
AT -0.6305 -0.58 AT 0.0029 8.29
BE -0.1194 -0.04 BE -0.0004 -1.25
ES -1.1308 -0.95 ES 0.0072 13.34
FI -0.8030 -0.85 FI 0.0048 9.26
FR -0.0891 -0.05 FR 0.0050 91.41
IE -0.3772 -0.49 IE -0.0010 -3.18
IT -0.0260 -0.03 IT 0.0017 2.98
LU 0.7712 0.42 LU -0.0045 -9.32
NL -2.1108 -0.30 NL -0.0129 -4.22
PT -0.4090 -0.04 PT 0.0044 0.66
Maturing amount 0.0021 21.28 Short rate spread 0.7696 927.66
AT -0.0019 -3.77 AT -0.0226 -6.82
BE 0.0026 8.12 BE 0.0989 31.33
ES 0.0034 39.74 ES -0.0642 -71.89
FI 0.0025 409.91 FI -0.1251 -50.48
FR 0.0082 1.61 FR 0.0365 4.26
IE -0.0016 -12.90 IE 0.0114 6.85
IT -0.0016 -192.90 IT -0.0231 -9.40
LU 0.0001 0.47 LU 0.0707 10.30
NL -0.0080 -1.48 NL 0.0915 5.28
PT 0.0104 1.10 PT 0.0248 2.35
Post underb dummy -0.0226 -69.25 Lambda -0.0096 -509.23















PB R P B R
Ctry fulfilment DE -0.0128 -0.0001 Bidder size DE 3.6253
AT 0.0087 -0.0027 -0.0004 AT -23.2447 0.9286 0.1330
BE 0.0057 -0.0054 BE 1.5628 0.1488
ES 0.0031 -0.0031 0.0008 ES 8.0132
FI 0.0003 FI -1.1687
FR 0.0009 -0.0007 FR
IE -0.0008 IE 1.2113
IT -0.0012 0.0001 IT -1.3590
LU -0.0009 -0.0001 LU -0.3201 0.0718
NL NL 4.5873 -0.0880 -0.0482
PT PT 11.4254
Forward rate sprd DE 2.0070 -0.0899 Exp MRO amt DE 0.0039 -0.0002 -0.0002
AT -0.3516 AT 0.0001 -0.0002
BE -0.9809 -0.0679 BE 0.0040 -0.0003
ES 0.2717 -0.3700 -0.0518 ES 0.0028 0.0003 -0.0003
FI -0.0491 FI 0.0038 0.0013 -0.0003
FR -0.8402 FR -0.0001 -0.0001
IE 0.8665 -0.0257 IE 0.0002 -0.0002
IT 0.3692 -0.1940 IT -0.0028 0.0002
LU -0.1265 -0.0964 LU 0.0006 -0.0003
NL NL 0.0000 -0.0004
PT PT 0.0007 -0.0002
Volatility DE -15.6062 2.9410 Long rate spread DE 0.4791 0.0373 -0.0113
AT -53.8113 AT 0.0566 -0.0084
BE -75.2266 BE 1.0050
ES -47.1968 ES 0.2014 -0.0041
FI -46.9828 FI 0.2675 -0.0065
FR FR -0.0965 0.0005 -0.0062
IE -41.5131 IE 0.1208 -0.0123
IT IT 0.0986 -0.0095
LU LU 0.8678 0.1275 -0.0158
NL NL -0.0242
PT PT
Maturing amount DE 0.9950 0.5669 0.0021 Short rate pread DE 1.8913 0.0781 0.7696
AT 2.3201 0.2668 0.0003 AT 0.7470
BE 0.3654 0.2596 0.0047 BE 0.3045 0.8684
ES 0.5245 0.0055 ES 3.9343 0.7053
FI 0.3823 0.0046 FI 0.5396 0.6444
FR 6.8722 0.3850 FR 0.3567 0.8060
IE 2.1880 0.5530 0.0005 IE 0.3065 0.7810
IT 2.2905 0.5321 0.0005 IT 0.7464
LU 0.1896 0.1978 LU 0.2874 -0.1295 0.8403
NL 2.8332 0.2261 NL 0.8610
PT 3.3488 -0.1953 PT 0.7944
Post underb dum-
my 0.2490 0.0850 -0.0226
Period end dummy 0.3586 -0.0017 0.0064Table 10
BIDDER SIZE EFFECTS:  PROBABILITY OF BIDDING,
BID AMOUNT, AVERAGE BID RATE AND BID RATE DISPERSION
Probability
 of bidding
Bid amount Average bid rate Bid rate dispersion
PB R D
Coef  t stat Coef  t stat Coef  t stat Coef  t stat
Ctry fulfilment ratio -0.0041 -1.19 0.0000 -0.02 -0.0002 -11.82 0.0001 202.7
   LBD * x 0.0026 0.63 -0.0008 -0.08 0.0001 1.90 -0.0001 -70.6
Forward rate spread 1.8472 6.79 0.2210 0.26 -0.0053 -1.01 0.0030 41.8
   LBD * x -0.7305 -1.96 -0.7473 -0.54 -0.0056 -0.66 -0.0061 -51.9
Volatility -4.9417 -0.82 -6.2660 -0.20 2.4423 12.89 0.0209 8.0
   LBD * x -33.4189 -3.98 -10.9712 -0.05 0.6502 0.51 -0.0056 -0.3
Maturing amount 4.0431 10.55 0.5173 18.33 0.0057 33.12 0.0003 116.5
   LBD * x -3.4338 -8.85 0.0379 2.02 -0.0022 -18.94 0.0001 71.3
Postt underb dummy 0.3221 3.74 0.2045 0.50 -0.0238 -9.40 0.0054 156.3
Period end dummy 0.0652 2.32 -0.0088 -0.11 0.0053 10.66 0.0005 74.5
Bidder size 205.7991 7.78 0.5556 0.00 -0.1998 -0.10 -0.0856 -3.0
   LBD * x -205.2501 -7.76 0.3263 0.00 0.1986 0.10 0.0879 3.1
Exp MRO amount 0.0017 2.65 -0.0004 -0.74 -0.0002 -66.32 -8.E-06 -206.3
   LBD * x 0.0025 2.92 0.0006 0.58 0.0000 -0.27 2.E-05 251.3
Long rate spread 0.4077 7.28 0.0540 0.74 -0.0073 -16.31 0.0003 44.6
   LBD * x 0.0410 0.50 0.1627 62.41 -0.0017 -108.41 0.0007 3281.0
Short rate spread 1.8356 8.54 0.0675 1.05 0.7215 1827.27 0.0287 5272.0
   LBD * x 0.0792 0.25 0.2255 0.34 0.0625 15.55 0.0037 66.2
Lambda 0.0735 1.18 0.0065 16.93 -0.0004 -78.4
No of obs 23178 11641 11641 11641
No of groups 402 387 387 387
Obs per group:     min 1 1 1
  avg 30.1 30.1 30.1
   m a x 5 95 95 9
R squared:        within 0.2666 0.7961 0.1868
                     between 0.7521 0.4782 0.0166
                        overall 0.5968 0.7551 0.1315
F(19,11235) 214.96 2309.05 135.87
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000Table 11
BANK GROUP EFFECTS:  PROBABILITY OF BIDDING,
BID AMOUNT, AVERAGE BID RATE AND BID RATE DISPERSION
Probability
 of bidding
Bid amount Average bid rate Bid rate dispersion
PB R D
Coef  t stat Coef  t stat Coef  t stat Coef  t stat
Ctry fulfilment ratio -0.0018 -0.61 -0.0004 -15.05 -0.0001 -463.8 0.0001 9428.2
   BGD * x -0.0092 -2.15 0.0008 8.71 -0.0001 -173.5 -4.9E-05 -6555.9
Forward rate spread 1.0723 2.44 0.0787 8.82 -0.0016 -58.6 0.0010 883.7
   BGD * x -0.1265 -0.22 -1.2372 -33.14 -0.0129 -220.5 -0.0061 -3984.3
Volatility -35.6375 -3.81 -10.8940 -55.08 2.8029 2630.8 0.0451 2738.3
   BGD * x -14.0389 -1.09 -20.9629 -17.68 0.4925 59.6 -0.0335 -1456.6
Maturing amount 0.7711 6.84 0.4196 69.86 0.0041 1505.7 0.0011 4669.3
   BGD * x -0.1232 -0.91 0.1381 19.73 -0.0019 -634.0 -0.0008 -3263.4
Postt underb dummy 0.8011 5.81 0.3439 75.14 -0.0215 -1486.3 0.0058 17727.4
Period end dummy 0.0106 0.24 -0.0171 -16.18 0.0047 1564.6 0.0004 8034.0
Bidder size -1.6458 -1.71 -0.5393 -19.20 0.0019 54.1 -0.0008 -394.7
   BGD * x 2.6118 2.40 2.0590 24.56 0.0049 89.1 0.0037 1730.5
Exp MRO amount 0.0050 4.82 -0.0003 -15.71 -0.0002 -4617.8 -2.2E-06 -1102.8
   BGD * x -0.0035 -2.61 0.0006 15.45 7.2E-06 125.5 2.2E-05 7061.1
Long rate spread 0.6067 6.70 0.1720 79.71 -0.0117 -4351.9 0.0014 8482.2
   BGD * x -0.0778 -0.60 0.1004 24.64 0.0037 672.1 -0.0007 -2984.4
Short rate spread 0.9161 2.66 0.2452 28.69 0.7651 26835.8 0.0360 14984.5
   BGD * x -0.0448 -0.09 0.1092 8.30 0.0173 389.4 -0.0030 -1064.6
Lambda -0.0464 -30.38 -0.0093 -2127.9 0.0001 438.1
No of obs 9322 5354 5354 5354
No of groups 158 155 155 155
Obs per group:     min 2 2 2
  avg 34.5 34.5 34.5
   max 59 59 59
R squared:        within 0.2670 0.8374 0.2687
                     between 0.4550 0.5148 0.0350
                        overall 0.4002 0.8122 0.1976
F(19,5180) 99.32 1404.58 100.17
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000Table 12
ARCH ESTIMATION FOR 2-WEEK INTEREST RATE VOLATILITY
We report our specification for the conditional variance of the daily 2-week EONIA swap rate (see Appendix 1).
The Governing council dummy takes the value 1 on the day of the ECB Governing Council meeting and 0 oth-
erwise. The Negative MRO dummy is equal to 1 on auction day if the lagged short spread is negative, i.e. when
the probability of underbidding is positive. The post underbidding dummy takes the value 1 after the occurrence
of an underbidding episode. The Last-in-month and Second-last-in-month dummies take value 1 on the last and,
respectively, the second last working day of the month. The Second-last in period dummy is equal to 1 on the
second last day of the maintenance period. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 percent or less.
ARCH(1) model
Coeff.S t d .  e r r . S i gn.
Conditional mean
Lagged rate 1.000 0.000 ***
Conditional variance
Lagged short rate spread 3.503 1.057 ***
Governing council dummy 3.142 0.315 ***
Negative MRO dummy 3.962 0.546 ***
Post underbidding dummy 1.606 0.589 ***
Last-in-month dummy -2.274 0.820 ***
Second-last-in-month d. 1.370 0.418 ***
Second-last-in-period d. 0.956 0.338 ***
Constant -8.360 0.140 ***
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